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This paper is an excerpt of the sixth chapter of my dissertation, “Nelson Rockefeller Confronts 
the Radical Right: The Life and Death of Moderate Republicanism in the 1960s.”  I owe a major 
debt of gratitude to the Rockefeller Archive Center and the knowledgeable and welcoming 
archivists and staff, who were an integral part of completing this project.  I want to thank 
archivist, Amy Fitch, in particular, for her generous assistance over the years. 
 
On November 8, 1966, the Republican Party won impressive electoral gains across the 
nation—forty-seven new seats in the House, three in the Senate, and eight gubernatorial wins.  
The G.O.P. continued its advances in the no-longer-solid South and maintained its presence in 
northern industrial centers, while continuing its traditional dominance in the Midwest.  These 
victories were a great relief after Goldwater’s staggering loss to Johnson two years before.  
Candidates who represented the party’s right and left wings had impressive wins: Ronald Reagan 
defeated an incumbent to become the governor of California, Edward Brooke won a U.S. Senate 
seat from Massachusetts, and Senator Clifford Case of New Jersey won reelection.  RNC 
Chairman Ray Bliss downplayed the divisions between the party’s moderates and conservatives 
by encouraging tolerance within the party.  He also sought to rebuild the party on the foundation 
of sound financing, organization, and Republican rhetoric on fiscal responsibility, which, for 
him, meant blaming the Democratic Party for the nation’s rising rate of inflation.1  Immediately 
after Goldwater’s loss, Bliss told the public that the party was big enough to comprise men as 
different as Goldwater and Jacob Javits—if the Democrats could “settle their differences,” so too 
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could the Republicans “develop a strong united front.”2  While Democrats were able to win 
major gains in 1964, Republican victories in 1966 suggested that the era of Democrats settling 
their internal differences was nearing its conclusion.   
 Republicans became the new champions of party unification and while Bliss looked to 
economic policy to lead the party to victory the tense status of race relations in 1966 helped the 
party more.  The month before the election, Newsweek reported that for the first time since 1962, 
the majority of Americans polled by Gallup (fifty-two percent) said the Johnson Administration 
was pushing civil rights too fast.  Louis Harris, however, found that closer to seventy-five 
percent of Americans thought the Johnson Administration was moving too fast, which he 
attributed to backlash politics.  Harris predicted that backlash politics—understood as a 
resistance to the civil rights movement, new federal civil rights laws, and unrest in the streets 
related to public protests and urban riots—could be the decisive factor in nearly half of the 
districts where freshmen Democratic congressmen sought re-election.
3
  A Harris survey from the 
same month found that sixty-nine percent of respondents thought that the Republican Party 
“would do a better job of slowing down the pace of civil rights.”4  It was an important 
distinction.   
By 1966, urban unrest had become a pivotal issue in American society, most notably 
during the August 1965 riot in the Watts neighborhood of Los Angeles, California.  Much of the 
nation was shocked when just days after the signing of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 a traffic 
stop incited a confrontation between black residents and white police officers that resulted in six 
days of rioting and left thirty-four people dead, over one thousand injured, and upwards of forty 
million dollars in property damage.  “After three summers of ghetto rioting and one charged with 
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talk of ‘black power,’ few northern politicians,” wrote Newsweek, “were willing to write off 
backlash” as a “purely Southern phenomenon.”5   
The 1966 campaign season enabled Republicans to consolidate and build upon the 
themes prominently discussed during Goldwater’s candidacy, including opposition to civil rights 
legislation, veneration of states’ rights, and fear of urban crime.  Urban riots played a major role 
in exacerbating feelings of uncertainty and resistance to the expansion of African American 
rights.  Even Nelson A. Rockefeller (NAR), who sought a third-term in office, deployed new 
strategies in race relations to respond to the growing controversy caused by the civil rights 
movement.  New York’s governor remained an advocate of civil rights, but he tempered his 
message to suit the tenor of the times.  The nation fractured as civil rights activists continued to 
fight social and economic inequality that persisted despite legislative victories, leaving moderate 
Republicans in a precarious position. 
 With the aid of slogans such as “Governor Rockefeller for Governor” to emphasize his 
leadership experience and inventive advertising techniques, NAR attempted to reestablish his 
brand as an innovative and responsive leader.  After two terms in office in which NAR called for 
tax increases and two unsuccessful presidential bids, many accused the governor of being too 
wealthy and personally ambitious to be concerned with the average New Yorker.  NAR 
appointed civil rights leaders like Jackie Robinson and Reverend Wyatt Tee Walker to help him 
reconnect to African Americans who were no longer as receptive to liberal politicians, 
particularly those within the Republican Party, which they now associated with racial 
conservatism.  While offering support for the black freedom struggle, NAR found ways to 
connect with white New Yorkers who were becoming more resistant to the demands of African 
Americans in a period of increasing urban crime and unrest.  In the days before the election, he  
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refused to offer unqualified support for the newly appointed Civilian Complaint Review Board, 
which was instituted by John Lindsay, as a means for racial minorities to voice grievances 
related to police misconduct and brutality.  Instead, NAR accused his Democratic opponent, 
Frank O’Connor, who supported the civilian review board, of being “soft on crime” to take 
advantage of the fear of urban crime and unrest in black communities to beat his Democratic 
opponent. 
 This chapter examines the range of strategies NAR employed during the 1966 
gubernatorial campaign to extend the life of moderate Republicanism in New York.  He  
designed a sophisticated and nuanced campaign that appealed to African Americans and 
increasingly racially conservative whites, by catering to concerns within both communities that 
were becoming at odds with one another.  In a period when urban uprisings and crime became 
more commonplace in cities and Republicans blamed liberal Democrats, NAR used similar 
tactics to attack his Democratic opponent.  He was careful, however, to maintain his relationship 
with the black community by avoiding the race-baiting of more conservative Republicans.  The 
1966 gubernatorial campaign reintroduced NAR to the people of New York and with the support 
of deep coffers and his record of progressive and expensive programs, he held together the 
increasingly fragile voter base that had secured his victories in the past.  While NAR won an 
impressive third-term reelection, he began to undermine his steadfast record of racial liberalism 
that had set him apart from other mainstream politicians. 
 
Racial Politics and Moderate Republicanism 
 Although the civil rights movement was still largely popular, NAR became increasingly 
careful to avoid associations with its more controversial elements because of his liberal civil 
rights record.  Polling data showed that a significant cross-section of Americans thought that the 
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Johnson Administration and civil rights activists were pushing for change too quickly and in a 
reelection year NAR sought to distance himself from such opinions.  Speculation about the 
significance of a “white backlash” to the civil rights movement was high for the duration of the 
Goldwater campaign.  In the days prior to the election, pollsters still thought the backlash might 
be the major factor that could garner Goldwater a significant amount of votes despite polling 
numbers to the contrary.  While opposition to the activism of the civil rights movement did not 
decide the 1964 presidential election, resentment toward the black community grew as more 
white people believed blacks were demanding rights they did not deserve or were expecting 
change too quickly.  For northerners, the efforts of civil rights activists were easier to support 
when they appeared on newscasts covering the South, rather than when they threatened their way 
of life at home.  Even as efforts to desegregate the South drew sympathy from many white 
Americans in the North, local struggles to desegregate northern schools and neighborhoods often 
incited intense protest and violence.   
The survey data NAR collected in preparation for his first gubernatorial run suggested 
this contradiction.  He found that respondents were most concerned—and were often angry—
about neighborhood change and the increasing migration of Puerto Ricans to New York City.  
Sam Lubell, who created the report for NAR in 1958, noted that this could be a very fruitful 
campaign issue if a politician chose to exploit the increased racial tensions in cities.  Although 
aware of the growing discord related to race on the neighborhood level in New York and the 
political problems it posed, NAR chose to reach out to Puerto Ricans and African Americans.  In 
turn, they rewarded him with an uncommon connection to his politics and campaigning style.  As 
the 1960s progressed, however, it became common for politicians to use racial tension to their 
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benefit once urban uprisings became more common and the civil rights movement shifted focus 
to de facto school and housing segregation in the North. 
 Two days after the conclusion of the 1964 Republican National Convention a riot first 
broke out in Harlem followed by others in Bedford-Stuyvesant in Brooklyn, and Rochester, New 
York.  The frustration and anger that drove some African Americans to walk out of their homes 
and burn and loot the neighborhoods they inhabited, but typically did not own, was long felt.   
However, the unrest in Harlem was first triggered by a rally held to protest the murder of a black 
teenager by a police officer.  James Powell, a fifteen-year-old, was fatally shot by New York 
City police officer, Lieutenant Thomas Gilligan, after James and his friends got into a 
confrontation with a building superintendent who tried to chase them off with the spray of a 
water hose.  Tensions were already high in the community.  The rally to protest Powell’s murder 
was originally planned by a chapter of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE)—a civil rights 
organization founded in Chicago in 1961—to draw attention to the disappearance and suspected 
murder of three civil rights workers in Neshoba County, Mississippi.  At the last minute it was 
reorganized to protest Powell’s murder.   
The peaceful rally eventually drew a large crowd who gathered at the West 123
rd
 police 
station to demand the suspension of Gilligan who was on paid sick leave because of an injury he 
was reported to have obtained in the altercation with Powell.  The crowd began to clash with 
police in front of the station and chaos ensued.  After the first night of rioting, the Chicago 
Defender reported the death of a single Negro man at the hands of the police, while the New 
York Times emphasized the property damage at the hands of what were described as wild roving 
mobs of blacks, who attacked the police with anything they could throw, while the police fired 
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warning shots into the air.  When the uprisings came to a close, five people died, eight hundred 
sixty-seven were injured, and sixteen hundred and fifty were arrested in the three communities.
6
 
In 1964, NAR spoke before the convention on July 14, unrest broke out in Harlem the 
night of July 18, and spread to Bedford-Stuyvesant on July 20, but not until rioting broke out in 
Rochester on July 24, was the governor compelled to release a public statement.  On July 25, 
1964, NAR released a statement from the Executive Chamber in Albany denouncing the riots in 
New York City and Rochester that alluded to his speech condemning extremism at the 
Republican National Convention.   
Such lawlessness, hoodlumism, and extremism from whatever source or for whatever 
reason, will be met by the full force of the law.  There are disturbing indications that 
there may be organized efforts to incite or abet such disturbances.  The overwhelming 
majority of the people in the areas where these incidents have occurred are decent, law-
abiding citizens.
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Before this statement NAR was absent.  Two days after the violence erupted, James Farmer 
requested that NAR send state troopers to Harlem to protect the residents from city police, but 
received no response—NAR was vacationing in Wyoming and had yet to return to New York.8  
Mayor Wagner was also on vacation when the riot broke out in Harlem, but he managed to return 
to the city and President Johnson ordered the FBI to Harlem to investigate days before NAR 
released his own statement.
9
  When NAR finally broke his silence, he said rioting and looting 
would not be condoned, while praising the police who he called “our principal bulwark against 
mob violence and chaos.”  NAR assured the public that although he had been out of state—and 
noticeably silent—he was in “continuous communication with the appropriate officials.”   
 Just days after NAR railed against the extremism of Goldwater and his supporters, he 
cited extremism for the rioting.  He told the minorities of New York that they had the most to 
gain from “law and order” and warned that “mob rule and looting” only endangered “their 
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cause” and the foundations of an orderly democratic society.10  The following day he activated 
the New York National Guard and sent units to Rochester along with state troopers, to prevent 
more violence.  Ultimately, the governor flew to Rochester unannounced to survey the damage 
on July 28.  He reiterated his previous statements denouncing the unjustifiable extremism in 
Rochester and warned that violence could not achieve progress in a democratic society.  
Furthermore, NAR did not acknowledge the specific complaints of black residents who cited 
police brutality and a lack of police review for inciting the violence nor did he meet with African 
American leaders, such as those in the NAACP who met with the mayors of New York City and 
Rochester. 
 While Rockefeller said little about the possible long-standing issues in the minority 
communities that made them fertile ground for violent clashes between residents and law 
enforcement, Robinson, who served as an aide to the governor, chose to speak out in his 
newspaper column.  The forty-six year-old Major League Baseball Hall of Fame member and 
current Chairman of the Board of Harlem’s Freedom National Bank, expressed concern, because 
newspapers in the Midwest and West reported that droves of criminals incited the uprising and a 
“reign of terror” after the justifiable murder of a black teen.  While Robinson refuted the claims 
that Harlem was overrun by criminals, he regretted the violence in Harlem because he believed it 
gave Goldwater, and people like him, ammunition to use against the black community.  
Robinson assured his readers that the uprising was the result of frustration over police brutality 
in Harlem and unprosecuted violence against African Americans across the nation.  The Negro 
community would not “turn the other cheek forever,” he warned.  He feared future violent 
outbreaks, but said he understood the frustration that inspired it.  “I do not have to be in Harlem,” 
Robinson wrote, “to be familiar with the kind of frenzied and sadistic brutality that many of the 
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New York City police force feel they can get away with in dealing with Negro and Puerto Rican 
citizens.”11  Robinson’s sympathetic view stood out in opposition to the Rockefeller 
Administration. 
 Shortly after the unrest in Harlem, NAR received letters from across the country 
criticizing his response.  Amid letters that attributed the situation to a wide range of causes from 
deplorable living conditions to the savagery of Negroes, a couple from Port Chester, New York, 
blamed the “rioting of lawless Negro[es]” on Rockefeller and city officials’ “past and present 
appeasement of Minority Groups.”  Lucile Jansen of Miami, Florida, said the riots were a 
“forewarning of what the Negroes intend to do” and complained that leaders like Rockefeller 
supported the use of the national guard in the South, but did nothing when wild mobs roamed the 
streets of New York.  She continued, “If this is the way you would handle the Negro rioting in 
the country should you have been elected President we are fortunate indeed that Mr. Goldwater 
carried the nomination.”12  NAR would continue to face these criticisms as urban uprisings 
became a more common and increasingly dreaded occurrence.   
Urban unrest like that in New York in July 1964, infuriated many whites who blamed 
blacks and leaders like NAR, who they believed condoned it.  The anger and frustration caused 
by urban unrest would grow and become increasingly controversial throughout the 1960s.  
Critics who had long opposed the civil rights movement and the efforts of the black community 
to achieve social and economic parity, needed little to convince them that African Americans 
deserved no more favors.  The fallout would be tremendous for the African American 
community and the politicians associated with their demands for equality.  The political careers 
of leaders like Johnson and NAR were soon jeopardized.   
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 In the spring of 1968, for example, NAR and his aides sought strategies to fend off an 
attack from Phyllis Schlafly in her book, Safe Not Sorry, where she accused NAR of approving 
of the race riots.  NAR’s aides told him that he should avoid conversations related to her 
accusations if possible, but if necessary, he should insist that he did not condone violence.  
NAR’s staff believed that his words had been distorted because of his “known record in favor of 
civil rights.”13  He was not alone.  NAR faced the criticism that the Republicans would usually 
direct toward liberal Democrats.  In July 1966, Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey appeared 
before the NAACP’s 55th Annual Convention in Los Angeles, California and told the audience 
that if he lived in a ghetto he would “lead a mighty good revolt.”  Republicans took advantage of 
Humphrey’s statement saying, “high officials of this Administration had condoned and 
encouraged disrespect for law and order.”  Ultimately, such attacks left the Johnson 
Administration, and the Rockefeller’s, on the defensive.14   
 By the mid-1960s, NAR had to navigate an increasingly hazardous middle ground 
between Republicans who expected him to adopt more racially conservative positions and his 
black allies who looked to him to preserve racially progressive Republicanism.  Shortly after 
conservative whites accused NAR of endangering New Yorkers by not condemning the African 
Americans that rioted, Robinson told the governor that he was not doing enough to prevent the 
“violence and bloodshed” that would arise if Goldwater was elected president.  NAR gave 
minimal support to the Goldwater campaign.  At first his staff said he would not campaign for 
the national Republican ticket, but eventually he did offer an endorsement from “top to bottom.”  
After a couple of campaign appearances in upstate New York where NAR praised Goldwater for 
his “courage and integrity” and chastised New York Republicans for what he called the “childish 
horseplay of being divided,” Robinson expressed his disappointment.15   
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Dear Governor Rockefeller: 
 
I see that Barry Goldwater is now, in your opinion, a man of courage and integrity.  You 
know and I know that a Goldwater victory would result in violence and bloodshed.  His 
candidacy reeks with prejudice and bigotry.  His remark that this has become a nation 
ruled by minorities while the majority suffers is not only stupid, but undeserving of 
support from a man with real courage and integrity. 
 
Perhaps it makes no difference, but I have to let you know that I am truly sorry you have 
taken this stand, for you know what Barry Goldwater means—not only to the Negro 
people—but to so many other Americans of good-will.  It seems to me that to support 
him is to reject the ideals and principles for which the Rockefeller name has always 
stood.  Your doing so is one of the most disappointing things which has ever happened to 
me … 
 
Your Friend, 
 
Jackie Robinson
16
 
 
NAR was the moderate Republican who had jeopardized his political career the most to oppose 
Goldwater, but by extending a minimum amount of support to Goldwater to meet the basic 
expectations of party unity during the campaign season, he received criticism from his most 
liberal supporters, both black and white.   
 
Reintroducing Nelson Rockefeller 
 Rockefeller began hiring new staff in preparation for his 1966 reelection campaign in late 
1964.  He also commissioned private studies of New Yorkers to monitor his political standing 
throughout 1965.  The governor had Lloyd Free prepare reports analyzing his prospects against 
potential Democratic and Republican opponents.  The news was not good.  Free’s analysis from 
December 1965, for example, read: “In brief, the overall picture that emerges from the December 
study is only mildly encouraging as compared with our survey last May, when you really hit 
bottom.  There has been some improvement—particularly in certain aspects of your ‘image’—
but, from the point of view of your standing vis-à-vis potential competitors, the situation remains 
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decidedly unfavorable.”  The major problem, according to Free, was the persistent stereotype 
that NAR was not “for the people” and too much of a big spender.  Almost half of the people 
surveyed associated NAR with two groups of descriptors: “Poor fiscal policy, high tax man, 
unbalanced budget” and “Not helpful for the people—seems above the common man; not helpful 
to the poor little man.”17   
Among possible Republican contenders, both Javits and Lindsay were more than twice as 
popular as NAR.  In response to NAR’s decline in popularity, some New York Republican 
legislators encouraged Javits to oppose NAR for the nomination.  The senator canvassed the state 
to see if he could potentially beat NAR, but the nominating system in New York favored the 
incumbent.  New York was one of the few states at the time that did not choose candidates in 
open primaries.  Javits would need to take the nomination at the state convention—an unlikely 
scenario that NAR was able to prevent.   
 After the state nominating conventions, the gubernatorial race became a four-man contest 
between NAR, the Republican Party candidate, Frank D. O’Connor, the Democratic Party 
candidate, Franklin Roosevelt, Jr., the Liberal Party candidate, and Paul L. Adams, the 
Conservative Party candidate.  The ballot was a bit more crowded than usual.  In the past, the 
Liberal Party had always endorsed the Democratic Party nominee, but liberal Democrats in 1966 
decided not to endorse O’Connor, the former Queens District Attorney and the current New 
York City Council President because of his association with party bosses.  The split among 
Democrats resulted in a weakened position for O’Connor, who would lose some traditional 
Democratic supporters to Roosevelt.   
While New York Republicans were also split between those who supported NAR and 
more conservative party members who backed Adams, a political science professor and dean at 
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Roberts Wesleyan College outside of Rochester, New York, the Liberal Party nominee posed a 
more significant threat to O’Connor.  A private poll taken shortly after the state’s nominating 
conventions found that thirty percent of New Yorkers said they would vote for NAR.  While that 
number reflected an improvement from previous polls, NAR still trailed O’Connor by seven 
percent.
18
  O’Connor was in the lead, but running against an incumbent with the resources and 
determination of NAR would be a daunting task. 
 The previous January, long before NAR’s opponents began their campaigns in 
September, the governor and his staff launched an exhaustive ten-month campaign.  To combat 
his low approval ratings the governor made appearances in all of New York’s sixty-two counties, 
delivered three hundred and eighty speeches, and hired agencies that produced cutting-edge 
advertisements for television and radio that were particularly uncommon for non-presidential 
races.  By Election Day, NAR outspent his Democratic opponent ten-to-one.
19
  He conducted a 
systematic and dogged campaign to reach as many people as possible and address the concerns 
of diverse segments of the electorate.  The good news for NAR was that voters rarely mentioned 
his personal life, but they often complained about his record on increasing taxes and fees, and on 
the state’s high taxes overall.   
After taxes, pollsters found that “crime and juvenile delinquency,” education, “narcotics 
and dope addiction,” aging/deteriorating neighborhoods, and “civil rights and integration” were 
most likely to concern respondents.  It was difficult to strike a balance between limiting taxation 
and meeting the public’s expectations for services in New York.  While the New Yorkers polled 
opposed NAR’s record on taxing and spending, they said they wanted a governor who favored 
more spending for education, tuition assistance, aid for the mentally disabled, and the reduction 
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of water pollution.
20
  As the incumbent, he needed to practice great care in meeting these 
conflicting demands.  
NAR and his staff relied upon new advertising techniques to present the governor’s case.  
James M. Perry, a senior editor of the National Observer, described the campaign as “probably 
the most expensive nonpresidential campaign ever put together in America.  Not only the most 
expensive, but one of the most professional, one of the most astute, one of the most imaginative, 
and one of the most ruthless.”21  In his book, The New Politics: The Expanding Technology of 
Political Manipulation, Perry analyzed the effect of professional political managers, scientific 
polling, data processing, and the use of mass media to make direct appeals to the voter in the 
1960s.   
Many of these trends were not unique to the 1960s, as he noted, but Perry argued that 
they were used more effectively in this period to tailor campaigns more closely to the interests of 
a diverse and increasingly demanding electorate.  NAR’s 1966 gubernatorial campaign stood out 
for more than its unprecedented cost.  His bid for reelection was designed by an innovative 
advertising agency that helped the governor use television commercials to set the tone of his 
campaign in stages from the weeks before the state convention that nominated NAR—considered 
the pre-campaign—until the final days against O’Connor.  The NAR team settled on Jack Tinker 
& Partners, a New York advertising agency started in 1960.  NAR became the first politician to 
join the agency’s cadre of clients including Alka-Seltzer and Braniff Airways, Inc.22   
 The agency’s first task was to reintroduce New Yorkers to NAR’s accomplishments, not 
NAR himself.  They decided that neither NAR nor his voice would be used in the early 
commercials—a first for a political candidate in this period.23  The first Tinker advertisement 
featured hand puppets discussing Rockefeller’s Pure Waters Program.  It was eye catching and 
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drew the viewer in over the sixty second duration with information about a single program rather 
than focus on a list of the governor’s accomplishments.24  The early commercials reflected the 
campaign’s first phase or “soft-sell.”  Perry found NAR’s use of advertising notable because of 
its targeted approach that made it possible to create a campaign that was customizable to suit 
trends in public viewership and opinion down to the county level as Election Day drew near.  
The first phase of commercials never mentioned opponents or even the upcoming election; 
rather, they sold NAR’s achievements on issues such as increasing state-aid for college tuition 
and improving the state’s network of roads. 
 The second phase of advertisements commenced after the convention.  They relied less 
on humor—and puppets—and were narrated by NAR, but they still refrained from mentioning 
his Democratic opponent.  The commercials continued to focus on single programs advanced by 
the governor, but they featured a more staid tone when discussing the state’s new minimum wage 
law or the Medicaid program—“Rockefeller’s Medicaid, we hope you never need it.”25  The 
advertisements would end with NAR speaking directly into the camera making a case for high-
cost programs that could and would incur the wrath of conservative Republicans.  These 
commercials, offered a stark defense for programs that the private polls said the voters wanted, 
although they balked at the cost. 
 The third phase of advertisements attacked O’Connor directly.  In these advertisements, 
the Rockefeller campaign portrayed the Democrat as a product of New York City’s corruption 
and mismanagement.  NAR exploited the classic upstate-downstate divide in New York.  One 
version of the commercials in this series used a simple black background with a bi-line at the 
bottom of the screen stating that the viewer was watching an advertisement.  A narrator, not 
NAR, stated, “Frank O’Connor, the man who led the fight against the New York State Thruway 
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is running for governor.  Get in your car, get down to the polls, and vote.”26  Other 
advertisements in this phase featured NAR at a podium, as if at a dramatically lit press 
conference, where he portrayed himself as tough and hard-hitting opposed to O’Connor.  The 
negative advertisements at this stage in the campaign, in particular, reflected what Perry called a, 
“sharp turn for the worse,” because they were no longer “ethically acceptable.”27   
 Perry, who admired NAR, calling him a strong campaigner, an “exceptionally able 
governor,” and a “genuine product to market,” said the governor crossed the line into murky 
territory as Election Day neared.
28
  For example, the criticism of O’Connor’s stance on the 
Thruway artfully misrepresented the former state legislator’s position on the highway.  
O’Connor, like the majority of Democrats in the state legislature, did not oppose the construction 
of the thruway, he opposed the tolls that Republican legislators wanted to institute.  Due to a 
general lack of organization on the part of the Democrats, they had little success trying to correct 
such statements, while asserting O’Connor’s message.  NAR’s flush coffers also meant that he 
could easily inundate voters with television advertisements, which began airing in late July.  The 
Rockefeller campaign, for example, paid for two hundred and eight commercials on WNBC in 
New York City at a cost of $237,000, compared to the O’Connor organization’s twenty-three 
commercials on the same station for $41,000.
29
   
 
The Changing Politics of Civil Rights 
 The Rockefeller campaign made impressive and innovative use of television when many 
politicians were only beginning to realize the potential of the medium, but NAR did not rely on 
technology alone. To reach voters, a great deal of effort was expended to help the governor 
connect with specific demographic groups through traditional campaigning.  The African 
American community received a disproportionate amount of NAR’s resources.  He sought to 
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reach out to African Americans by hiring advisers who had been active in the civil rights 
movement and were attuned to the social and political challenges faced by the black community.  
On February 7, 1966, NAR named Jackie Robinson his Special Assistant to the Governor for 
Community Affairs.  Robinson, who served on NAR’s personal staff, had worked for his 
campaigns in a smaller capacity in 1964 as a Deputy Campaign Director and as a head of a 
committee to re-elect him in 1962.  As an assistant for community affairs, Robinson said he 
hoped “to bring the remarkable Rockefeller record to the attention of minority groups throughout 
the state.”30   
Robinson often spoke of NAR’s longtime commitment to civil rights and his willingness 
to remain abreast of the current concerns of the black community without relying on his family’s 
philanthropy or his previous record.  For Robinson, who remained a devoted Republican, NAR 
represented hope that blacks would continue to have a place within the party.  “In our opinion,” 
said Robinson, “it is important for the Governor to ‘win big’ because, if he does, this will once 
again serve notice on the National Republican organization that the Goldwater, Bill Buckley 
route is the sure road to disaster.”31  Robinson did not always agree with NAR, as evidenced by 
his response to NAR’s decision to praise Goldwater, but he remained committed to the strand of 
racial liberalism the governor reflected within the party.   
In addition to his duties in-state, Robinson also called for greater unity among black 
Republicans nationally, intensified voter registration, and an effort to reverse the Goldwater 
influence that remained in the party.  Robinson told Glenn Douglas of the Chicago Defender that 
John Lindsay’s upset victory the year before to become mayor of New York City in 1965 was 
the result of a “Negro revolt in voting patterns,” and as a result both parties should have “more 
respect for the needs and ambitions of the Negro citizen.”  Robinson believed that a decisive 
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victory for NAR in 1966 would be significant for the nation.  He explained, “A whopping 
Rockefeller victory in this state, indicating that Negroes respect Mr. Rockefeller as a ‘stand-up’ 
Republican who will not sell out his principles, should really do wonders for our people 
nationally.”32 
 In Robinson’s newspaper column of January 15, where he praised NAR’s commitment to 
civil rights and the political health of the nation, he lauded the governor’s openness to criticism 
and willingness to make changes.  Robinson spoke from recent experience.  Just days before the 
column was published Robinson had a private meeting with NAR after he wrote a critical letter 
to him about the lack of black appointments to his staff. 
Dear Governor Rockefeller: 
 
This is one of the most difficult letters I have ever had to write.  It is, however, absolutely 
necessary. 
 
While I sincerely believe there is not a more dedicated politician on the scene, your 
record toward the Negro regarding political appointments cannot be accepted by any self-
respecting Negro.  In New York, it seems to me inexcusable, that on the state level, 
excluding a few appointments, you do not have any one of color on your staff.  In states 
far less sophisticated, as far as race relations are concerned, the governor is completely 
aware of the necessity of having qualified Negroes on his personal staff. 
 
I felt we had made it very clear at our meeting some time ago about the importance of 
appointments of this nature.  Little, if anything, has been done and [I] have been left in a 
most embarrassing position.  I can only come to the conclusion that nothing is going to be 
done, and because of what I stand for, my personal high regard for you cannot stand in 
the way of my desire to see the progress Negro Americans are making continued. 
 
Your inaction can only mean a lack of interest, which compels me to do whatever I must 
to bring it to the attention of the public.  If I am to be of any use to anyone I eventually 
support, whatever my value is, I can only be useful if I continue doing what I believe to 
be right.  Unless there is immediate action, Governor, I must publicly answer the 
challenges which have come to me concerning favorable articles I have written about you 
…33 
 
It appeared that Robinson’s insistence was significant enough for NAR to take action.  The 
following month, he hired Warren E. Gardner Jr. as an assistant press secretary, Wyatt Tee 
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Walker as Special Assistant for Urban Affairs, and Sandy F. Ray as a member of the governor’s 
youth commission—all of them African American.  Robinson had to make several overtures to 
get NAR to pay for the staff he promised him, but eventually he was able to hire his own staff 
including Alfred Duckett, founder of the public relations company Alfred Duckett Associates, 
who had collaborated on speeches and a book project with Martin Luther King, Jr.
34
 
 NAR’s new appointments helped maintain his connection to the civil rights movement 
and the black community by keeping him aware of the evolving concerns and expressions of the 
community’s activism.  In a period when the movement was perceived as taking on a more 
militant orientation, it was important for NAR to make adjustments.  At one point during the 
campaign Robinson alerted the governor to a potential problem.  Robinson explained that NAR’s 
ever-ready greeting of “attaboy” could be misinterpreted by African Americans because calling a 
black man a boy, which was tantamount to using a “dirty word.”35  While this example serves to 
show the attention to detail that NAR’s black staff members provided, which could be invaluable 
when campaigning, they also offered advice that went beyond style.  Reverend Walker’s role as 
urban affairs adviser offers insight into the extent of NAR’s efforts to change with the times.   
 When he appointed Walker, NAR said that the thirty-six year-old, former executive 
director of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, and aide to Martin Luther King, Jr., 
was the newest member of a team he was assembling to “tackle the multiple problems” of 
Negroes in urban areas.
36
  Walker intended to address issues related to defacto segregation, 
medical facilities, job opportunities, and narcotics trafficking.  Walker’s first task was to 
coordinate plans for two-year technical colleges that NAR proposed for Harlem, Bedford-
Stuyvesant, Buffalo, and Syracuse.  During the luncheon NAR held to announce his 
appointment, Walker expressed his personal aspirations for his new role and his intention to use 
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it to address a need for a new approach to alleviating the ills of black America.  Walker said that 
he and the governor shared “the conviction that the people of the area to which I will be giving 
primary attention have had enough social studies, political speeches and pious platitudes to last a 
lifetime.”37  Instead, it was time for action.  In his role as special assistant for urban affairs, 
Walker often talked about the need to tackle the “hopelessness and frustration” felt by inner city 
communities.
38
  Walker soon joined in NA R’s effort to reduce narcotics addiction and crime 
related to it, which Walker saw as a uniquely damaging scourge upon the black community.  
Walker served as a mouthpiece for NAR; he helped the governor address concerns shared by 
blacks who sought new ways to address persistent inequality. 
 Despite NAR’s new appointments and his attempts to tailor his message to meet the new 
demands of an important voting bloc, he experienced difficulties when campaigning in African 
American communities.  “Let me say, first, that I cannot tell you how much I admired your raw 
courage on Tuesday evening,” wrote Walker to Rockefeller.  “It certainly equaled or surpassed 
the San Francisco incident.  Under very, very trying circumstances, you did the very best that 
anyone could do.”39  Walker sent this encouraging message to NAR after he went on a quick tour 
to open storefront campaign headquarters in Harlem; Flushing, Queens; Bensonhurst, Brooklyn; 
and the South Bronx on August 9, 1966.  The New York Times wrote that the events—modeled 
after Lindsay’s mayoral campaign the year before—which included pretty girls in straw hats, 
staff armed with walkie-talkies, and bands that played jazz and rock and roll from the back of 
decorated trucks were successful despite some hecklers.
40
   
In Walker’s opinion, however, that the tour was not a success.  He argued that more 
forethought should have gone into the planning of the campaign tour stops in black communities.  
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Walker explained that what worked in the past to drum up goodwill and fanfare for NAR was no 
longer sufficient and they could not afford to repeat this mistake.  Walker explained:  
The black community is in a very ugly mood and have some very legitimate reasons for 
being so.  Most of it is despair, and any candidate who comes into their midst will feel the 
brunt of their venom and hostility because they are in no mood for voting for anybody so 
much as they are in the mood to vote against somebody.  Since you are the incumbent, 
you can’t escape feeling the wrath which is the harvest of apathy.”41  In this political 
climate, Walker said NAR should have never gone to Harlem without an effort made 
beforehand to emphasize the “new job program” or the “signing of some bill that touches 
the ghetto community.   
 
Furthermore, there was no outreach to the “Nationalists,” a reference to members of Black 
Nationalist groups—or perhaps those who sympathized with them.42  Black Nationalists gained 
attention in this period for their activism on behalf of the black community.  While they shared 
many of the same objectives as more traditional civil rights leaders, they placed a greater 
emphasis on racial pride and sometimes separatism opposed to integration.
43
 
 The summer of 1966 was difficult for civil rights activists and the broader African 
American community, and as Walker told NAR, there was a new level of frustration with elected 
officeholders.  Despite the passage of major civil rights legislation many blacks were upset that 
those hard-fought and undeniably important victories had not translated into tangible 
improvements amidst defacto segregation, a lack of jobs, and persistent inequality.  The year 
before, CORE met in Durham, North Carolina, for a convention entitled “The Black Ghetto: An 
Awakening Giant,” where the organization identified the need for a new phase of the freedom 
movement to address these disparities, particularly in the North.  Feelings of despair and fatigue 
within the black community inspired those at the convention and in groups such as the Student 
Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) to give a rallying cry for “Black Power,” which, 
for them, reflected a change in the attitude and emphasis of the African American freedom 
struggle.  It was a significant development, not because of a major change in the aims of these 
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activists, but in the response they received from Americans who feared calls for Black Power 
would lead to more violence.  It led to divisions within the civil rights movement, most 
significantly, Roy Wilkins of the NAACP rejecting Black Power and calling it reverse racism 
and “anti-white” power that would only spawn counter violence from whites.44   
Floyd B. McKissick, national director of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), 
rejected these characterizations.  In an article published in the Chicago Defender, he said the 
misinterpretation of Black Power to mean violence and racism was “further proof that there 
remains in this nation a malevolent Southern tradition that even now, seeks to divide black 
Americans into ‘good’ and ‘bad’ niggers.”45  McKissick said that the Black Power movement 
was founded in racial pride, not racial supremacy.  The ultimate goal was to mobilize black 
communities to create the meaningful change that eluded them.   
 Although the press often characterized this debate over Black Power as a split between 
traditional leaders like Wilkins of the NAACP and “radical” leaders such as McKissick, King 
also criticized Wilkins’ stance.  During an interview with Gene Roberts of The New York Times, 
King explained, “I get the impression that the N.A.A.C.P. wouldn’t mind a split because they 
think they are the only civil rights organization.”  He continued, “My problem with S.N.C.C. [the 
student committee] and CORE,” he said, “is not their militancy—I think you can be militantly 
nonviolent.  It’s what I see as a pattern of violence emerging and their use of the cry, ‘black 
power,’ which, whether they mean it or not, falls on the ear as racism in reverse.”46  Like King, 
Walter Lippmann, in his column for the Washington Post, called attention to the futility of a 
divide within the black community because of Black Power.   
 Lippmann discussed the “bleak realization” that progress had stalled and that African 
Americans, regardless of their opinion on Black Power or their approach to activism, would 
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make no more progress as the Vietnam War drained the nation of its resources.  The promise of 
Johnson’s 1964 election and the consensus it represented rested on the prospect that expansion of 
the economy—not tax increases—would make it possible to fulfill the promises of reform in 
housing, schools, jobs, and hospitals that were promised in recent federal legislation.  Lippmann, 
in his article, “Broken Promises,” concluded cogently,  
The crude truth is that the great majority of us, for the most part white, who are safely 
beyond the poverty line, will resist higher taxes in order to help the poor, so many of 
them black.  The Johnson consensus of 1965 was based on the economic calculation that 
the reforms could be financed by economic growth.  The rich would not have less, they 
would even have more, but not quite so much more.  This was the material foundation of 
the hope that a great society could be built by consensus.
47
   
 
Overall, the 1960s were an unmatched period of economic growth for the nation, but by the end 
of the decade the rising costs of the Vietnam War and the War on Poverty along with the 
Johnson Administration’s decision not to raise taxes meant the nation’s economy was 
overburdened.   
In 1966, the nation began to experience a slowed growth that would worsen until the 
recession of 1969.  The economy began to weaken because of several factors including rising 
inflation, the Federal Reserve’s tight fiscal policy, a decrease in production in manufacturing and 
construction, and increased competition in global markets.  One consequence of the contracting 
economy and diminished public support for social change in the mid-1960s was increased 
infighting between civil rights organizations that competed for the limited resources, political 
clout, and sympathies of white Americans.  The impact, however, extended far beyond debates 
over the strategies and rhetoric employed by activists. 
 The collapse of the liberal consensus Lippmann spoke of would leave many casualties in 
its wake.  While the nation’s poor would face the worst losses, politicians like NAR who relied 
on the liberal consensus would suffer significant losses too.   It was increasingly difficult to 
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cobble together a diverse voting base with promises of mutual—and for the majority, sacrifice-
free—prosperity.  As Walker noted, NAR was not a unique target for anger within the black 
community.  Instead, he experienced the aftereffects of African Americans’ disappointment and 
anger once they realized that full incorporation into American society was still beyond their 
grasp despite the support of a sitting president.  Campaign stops in Harlem with the standard 
reverie provided by pretty girls and lively bands were not going to be enough to earn the Negro 
vote, despite the efforts of NAR’s black aides, who often noted that despite his record he would 
have difficulty among blacks who were still upset about Goldwater’s nomination in 1964.  They 
warned NAR that the black community was badly fractured and in need of a delicate touch.  The 
Rockefeller campaign continued its targeted efforts in black communities into the fall, enlisting 
additional aid from black clergy.  It was essential that NAR capitalize on his record on civil 
rights, but seemingly intractable poverty, urban uprisings, and rising rates of crime and addiction 
helped to decrease much of the goodwill he would acquire.
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